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Refusing	to	dance	to	a	Brexit	tune:	How	the	EU	has
misinterpreted	Britain’s	vote	to	leave
Britain	has	made	numerous	mistakes	over	Brexit,	but	the	European	Union’s	record	also	needs	to	be
analysed.	Tim	Oliver	addresses	some	of	the	things	the	EU	has	been	accused	of	getting	wrong	about
Brexit.	In	this	post,	he	looks	at	how	the	EU	has	misinterpreted	Brexit.
Brexit	has	been	a	learning	experience	for	all	involved.	British	and	EU	negotiators	have	found
themselves	navigating	their	way	through	an	unprecedented	event,	while	academics,	researchers	and
commentators	have	struggled	to	keep	up	with	events,	while	also	trying	to	examine	the	broader	fallout	from	the	2016
vote.	Mistakes	were	bound	to	be	made,	and	there	has	certainly	been	no	shortage	of	them,	or	accusations	from	both
sides	that	the	other	is	approaching	the	process	in	the	wrong	way.
As	covered	in	the	first	post	in	this	series,	some	elsewhere	in	the	EU	might	bristle	at	the	suggestion	the	EU	has	made
mistakes	over	Brexit.	Surely	the	UK	has	been	the	guilty	party	here,	making	a	series	of	mistakes	that	began	with	–
and	in	some	cases	preceded	–	the	vote	to	leave.	Britain’s	handling	of	Brexit,	especially	that	of	its	government	and
leadership,	has	been	far	from	perfect.	But	given	the	unprecedented	nature	of	Brexit,	the	EU’s	own	approach	should
be	critically	reflected	on	for	lessons	and	analysis	for	what	it	can	tell	us	about	the	state	of	the	EU.
The	background	to	Brexit	itself	provides	a	starting	point	to	analysing	the	mistakes,	something	covered	in	the	first
post.	Was	the	EU’s	first,	and	perhaps	biggest,	mistake	being	too	lenient	or	harsh	on	the	UK	as	a	member	state?
One’s	view	on	this	can	define	one’s	views	of	how	the	EU	has	interpreted	and	responded	to	Brexit.
Credit:	European	Council	President	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Six	groups	of	mistakes
Interpreting	Brexit	has	been	tough	for	all	involved	because	Britain’s	vote	to	Leave	came	as	a	shock	to	many,	not
least	in	the	UK	itself.	It	has	provoked	a	mix	of	anger	and	regrets	across	the	rest	of	the	EU,	but	also	hopes	for	both
pro-Europeans	and	Eurosceptics.	In	the	rush	to	interpret	the	vote,	six	groups	of	mistakes	can	be	identified.
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1:	Myopic	vision
First,	Brexit	shattered	a	taboo	of	contemplating	the	EU	going	into	reverse.	Before	the	vote,	many	in	the	EU	–	not
least	those	committed	to	its	advancement	–	shared	something	of	a	myopic	vision	that	integration	was	inevitably
destined	to	move	forward,	even	if	that	was	at	varying	speeds	in	different	areas.	Theories	and	discussion	of	European
disintegration	took	place	on	the	fringe,	were	viewed	suspiciously	as	Eurosceptic	dreams,	or	seen	as	irrelevant.	That
taboo	helped	underpin	an	assumption	that	the	UK	was	going	to	stay,	there	being	a	widespread	view	that	there	was
no	viable	alternative	and	that	a	majority	of	the	British	people	would	share	this	view.	The	EU’s	leadership	and	those
who	debate	and	discuss	it,	failed	to	take	the	idea	of	Brexit	as	seriously	as	they	should.	As	a	result,	the	EU	has	learnt
the	hard	way	that	like	any	political	union	it	can	go	backwards	by	losing	members.
2:	Misinterpreted	timeframe
Second,	there	is	often	a	misinterpretation	of	the	timeframe	of	Brexit.	Polling	in	several	member	states	showed	an
increase	in	support	for	the	EU	after	Britain’s	vote.	This	can	be	taken	as	a	sign	the	EU	need	not	worry	about	Brexit
triggering	some	form	of	domino	effect	that	would	lead	to	the	unravelling	of	the	EU.	That	would	be	to	forget	that	Brexit
is	for	life,	not	just	for	the	two	years	of	article	50.	Britain’s	position	vis-à-vis	the	EU	in	a	decade	or	further	may	be	more
interconnected	to	the	EU,	complex	and	weak	than	appears	on	the	surface.	To	the	publics	elsewhere	in	the	EU,
however,	that	may	appear	a	minor	technicality	if	the	complexities	of	yet	another	crisis	such	as	in	the	Eurozone	engulf
the	EU.
3:	Credit	to	crises
Third,	Brexit	has	been	viewed	through	the	long-standing	myth	that	crises	are	what	drives	European	integration,	an
idea	deeply	woven	into	the	narrative	of	the	EU.	But	as	Desmond	Dinan	has	shown,	closer	inspection	reveals	a
somewhat	tenuous	link	between	crises	and	European	integration.	Integration	has	been	the	result	of	a	variety	of
factors,	with	crises	sometimes	playing	a	part,	but	by	no	means	being	the	key	factor	and	often	playing	no	part	at	all.
Giving	credit	to	crises	distracts	from	longer-running	developments	and	work	that	integration	depends	on.	Seeing
Brexit	as	a	crisis	that	can	only	be	positive	for	the	EU	risks	blinding	decision	makers	to	the	significance	of	the	full
scale	of	the	current	crisis	facing	the	EU,	of	which	Brexit	is	one	part.
4:	UK	vote	not	an	anomaly
Fourth,	interpreting	the	UK	vote	as	an	anomaly.	The	EU’s	history	is	replete	with	referendums	that	have	seen	citizens
vote	against	the	status-quo	and	more	European	integration.	Britain’s	vote	for	Leave	encapsulated	a	whole	series	of
concerns	about	the	state	of	the	UK,	but	the	EU	was	anything	but	an	easy	sell.	Since	the	UK’s	vote	there	might	have
been	an	increase	in	support	for	the	EU	in	other	member	states,	but	that	does	not	mean	citizens	are	willing	to	vote	for
further	European	integration.	Even	in	the	UK,	as	Clark,	Goodwin	and	Whiteley	showed	in	their	comprehensive	study
of	Brexit,	a	majority	of	Remain	voters	held	less	than	positive	views	of	the	EU.
While	the	context	of	every	referendum	is	unique,	Britain’s	vote	is	not	only	a	reminder	of	how	unpredictable
referendums	can	be	but	how	difficult	it	is	to	sell	the	EU.	As	President	Macron	admitted	in	a	BBC	interview	in	January,
while	the	context	in	France	is	different,	it	is	possible	that	a	similar	referendum	in	France	could	result	in	a	vote	to	leave
the	EU.	Dismissing	the	Brexit	vote	as	an	anomaly	reflective	of	Britain’s	history	of	awkwardness	does	little	to	help	find
a	way	to	go	about	reform	in	the	face	of	the	continuing	‘constraining	dissensus’	that	faces	European	integration	across
the	continent.
5:	No	alternatives
Fifth,	like	the	UK,	the	EU	has	struggled	to	interpret	what	Brexit	should	mean	as	a	destination.	The	UK	has	excelled
here,	with	Theresa	May	and	her	government	spending	the	past	year	outlining	what	they	don’t	want	Brexit	to	lead	to
(although	finding	unity	on	even	this	has	been	difficult)	rather	than	what	they	do	want	it	to	mean	and	how	to	get	there.
This	has	hidden	the	fact	that	the	EU	itself	has	struggled	to	define	what	Brexit	should	mean	because	it	has	either	put
the	emphasis	on	the	UK	to	come	up	with	answers	or	because	Brexit	forms	part	of	wider	and	difficult	questions	about
where	the	EU	is	headed	in	terms	of	its	own	development	and	place	in	Europe.	Proposals	such	as	the	‘Continental
Partnership’,	which	tried	to	find	an	alternative	to	exiting	models	of	pan-European	collaboration,	have	been	accused	of
arguing	for	the	EU	to	change	to	fit	a	departing	UK’s	needs.
Refusing	to	dance	to	a	Brexit	tune	is	understandable.	Dismissing	such	proposals	while	offering	no	alternatives,
however,	does	little	to	move	the	EU	forward	in	facing	a	problem	that	won’t	go	away.	Something	bespoke	will
inevitably	be	created	to	fit	the	UK.	Parking	the	UK	in	a	soft-Brexit	akin	to	EEA	membership	will	work	for	a	transition,
but	doesn’t	define	where	that	transition	will	eventually	take	the	UK	and	EU.
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6:	Denying	Brexit
Finally,	assuming	it	is	certain	that	Brexit	won’t	happen	and	that	Britain	(or	Scotland)	will	return	as	a	prodigal	son.	It
was	not	uncommon	after	the	referendum	to	be	asked	by	fellow	Europeans	whether	Britain	really	was	going	to	leave.
There	was	a	time	when	even	I	wondered	if	the	UK	government	would	go	through	with	a	full	Brexit,	as	opposed	to
actively	seeking	a	fudge	or	something	akin	to	EEA	membership.	But	Theresa	May,	largely	without	any	sense	of
strategy,	has	pushed	ahead	nonetheless.	That	may	well	lead	to	the	fudge	of	a	transition	where	the	UK	gets	stuck	in
something	akin	to	the	EEA.	But	with	a	year	to	go,	the	possibility	of	Brexit	being	stopped	seems	a	forlorn	hope	that
reflects	a	degree	of	denial	by	some.
That	denial	is	less	than	it	was	in	the	aftermath	of	the	June	2016	vote,	but	the	idea	the	UK	is	destined	to	re-join	still
has	a	long	life	ahead	of	it.	This	reflects	a	series	of	beliefs,	such	as	that	younger,	Remain	voting	UK	citizens	will	in
time	become	the	majority.	Such	thinking	ignores	the	challenge	of	a	UK	accession,	the	need	to	win	a	referendum	to
take	Britain	back	in,	and	that	any	pro-EU	campaign	would	face	a	massive	task	given	the	underlying	forces	that	drove
the	Leave	vote	have	not	disappeared	and	show	no	signs	of	doing	so.	It	will	take	a	massive	economic	and	political
shock	to	reverse	Brexit,	one	that,	if	economic,	would	also	hit	the	EU	hard.
There	is	also	the	belief	that	the	Scots	will	jump	ship	to	re-join	the	EU,	although	again	this	all	too	casually	overlooks
the	massive	economic,	security,	social,	legal,	diplomatic	and	political	challenges	Scotland	would	face	in	leaving	a
three-hundred-year	union	to	(re-join)	a	more	recently	established	one.	Whether	it	is	Scotland	or	the	UK	that	is
assumed	to	be	destined	to	return,	to	some	extent	this	is	part	of	the	assumption	discussed	earlier,	that	forward
moving	European	integration	is	inevitable	and	cannot	be	resisted.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	on	the	Clingendael	blog	and	LSE	Brexit.	The	article	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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